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Notes and Comments
OFFERS OF RECONCILIATION IN
MARYLAND DIVORCE LAW
It is generally understood that most domestic relations law
developed under the influence of an overriding concern with preserving
the sanctity of the marriage relationship. In decreeing divorces the
courts in a sense were forced to perform a function in which they, or
rather the society which they served, did not believe. Under a strong
and lingering religious influence, the hands-off policy of the courts
reflected society's desire that marriages not be terminated except in
extreme situations. As the Maryland Court of Appeals said in dealing
with a factually complicated desertion case:
It is not the province of the courts to settle marital disputes
or to determine what husbands and wives should do in order to
live harmoniously together. These are intensely personal matters
which the parties must determine for themselves. What the
courts have to do is determine the effect of actions that the parties
have already taken and to adjudicate their legal rights based on
these actions. In so doing, it is not the judicial province to
encourage separations or to labor to find grounds for divorce
where such grounds do not clearly appear. On the contrary, it
has always been recognized that legal separations should not be
decreed for light and trivial causes.'
As a corollary to this general policy, reconciliations of estranged
spouses were to be encouraged whenever possible. The Maryland
General Assembly certainly had this in mind when it included the
phrase "beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation" as one
of the requirements for a divorce on grounds of either desertion or
voluntary separation.2 And the Maryland judiciary has just as cer-
tainly been guided by this consideration in its development of the law
of divorce so as to favor spouses who attempt reconciliation in good
faith and to penalize spouses who unjustifiably reject such attempts.3
It can fairly be said from this that encouragement of reconciliation
1. Flohr v. Flohr, 195 Md. 482, 488, 73 A.2d 874, 876 (1950).
2. MD. ANN. CoDA art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969). It is interesting to note that the
new Maryland provision making an uninterrupted five-year separation a ground for
divorce, independent of considerations of desertion and voluntary separation, does
not include any such language concerning reconciliation. MD. ANN. CODA art. 16, § 24
(Supp. 1969).
3. See notes 12-28 infra and accompanying text.
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is a concept deeply embedded in the Maryland divorce law, both as a
general policy and as working rules developed by the legislature and
the courts. Section 26A of article 16 of the Maryland Code purports
to change these working rules by disallowing the use of offers of
reconciliation either as a defense to, or as a ground for, a divorce.
In all actions for divorce an offer of reconciliation or an
attempt to reconcile by one spouse without the concurrence of
the other spouse shall not be available as a defense to a divorce
nor in and of itself be a bar to a divorce; nor shall the refusal of
a spouse to accept an offer of reconciliation made by the other
spouse or the rejection by a spouse of any attempt at reconciliation
made by the other spouse be available as a defense to a divorce
nor in and of itself be a bar to or a ground for a divorce.4
It is the purpose of this comment to analyze the extent to which this
change in the law affects not only the underlying social and judicial
policies favoring reconciliation, but also the law of desertion and
voluntary separation in Maryland.
THE LAW INVOLVING OFFERS OF RECONCILIATION PRIOR TO
ARTICLE 16, SECTION 26A
Offers of reconciliation are important only in cases involving
voluntary separation and desertion because these are the only two
grounds for divorce in Maryland which require a separation of the
spouses with a certain intent, i.e., the intent to terminate the marital
relation. As the intent changes, so does the characterization of the
separation. Since offers of reconciliation are evidence of the intent
involved in the separation, they should be relevant in desertion and
voluntary separation cases. The same situation is not presented with
respect to other grounds for divorce, such as adultery, where an
offer of reconciliation by itself could not affect the characterization
of the original act, since intent to terminate the marriage relation is
not an element of the offense.
The Desertion Cases
Desertion is a ground for both an a mensal and an a vinculo
divorce' in Maryland. An a vinculo desertion must last for eighteen
4. MD. ANN. CoDF art 16, § 26A (Supp. 1969). Maryland stands alone in
enacting such legislation.
5. MD. ANN. CoDm art. 16, § 25 (1966).
6. MD. ANN. CoDn art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969). For an explanation and compari-
son of a vinculo and a mensa divorces, see Comment, The Confusing Maryland
Domestic Relations Procedures, 4 MD. L. RXv. 275, 281-85 (1940).
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months,7 while an a mensa desertion has no duration requirement
except that it must continue until the divorce action is begun.' Aside
from this difference, the elements of desertion in both instances are
substantially similar.9  The basic elements of desertion are an end
to cohabitation and an intention on the part of the offending party
to terminate the marriage relationship without cause."0 Additionally,
the elements must continue uninterrupted for the entire period of the
desertion."' It is in reference to the intent requirement, which
must exist throughout the entire separation period, that offers of
reconciliation become significant.
There are three situations discernible in the desertion cases in
which important legal consequences have resulted from the fact that
an offer of reconciliation was made. The first involves a spouse who,
after clearly deserting, returns and offers to renew the marriage
relationship, only to be rejected.12 Assuming the offer of reconciliation
is in good faith and the rejection is unjustified,"s it is clear that the
original deserter no longer has the requisite intent to end the marriage
relationship. Thus, providing that the eighteen month period has not
run before the making of the offer, proof of the offer and its rejection
formerly was a good defense to a suit by the spouse originally deserted. 4
Furthermore, the party who rejected the offer may have been guilty
7. MD. ANN. CoDt art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969).
8. MD. ANN. CoDe art. 16, § 25 (1966); Miller v. Miller, 153 Md. 213, 138 A.
22 (1927).
9. The statute defining a vinculo desertion requires that it be "beyond any rea-
sonable expectation of reconciliation." MD. ANN. CoDm art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969).
Art. 16, § 25, defining the a mensa grounds for divorce, does not contain this require-
ment Moreover this difference seems to have no practical significance which is dis-
cernible in case law.
10. E.g., Wood v. Wood, 227 Md. 211, 176 A2d 229 (1961) (a vinculo); Miller
v. Miller, 153 Md. 213, 138 A. 22 (1927) (a mensa).
11. E.g., Hubbard v. Hubbard, 127 Md. 617, 96 A. 860 (1916).
12. E.g., Thurlow v. Thurlow, 212 Md. 222, 129 A.2d 170 (1957) ; Hokemeyer v.
Hokemeyer, 194 Md. 223, 71 A.2d 15 (1950); Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657, 22 A.2d
475 (1941).
13. See notes 55-59 infra and accompanying text.
14. E.g., Hokemeyer v. Hokemeyer, 194 Md. 223, 71 A.2d 15 (1950) (dicta);
Simmont v. Simmont, 160 Md. 422, 153 A. 665 (1931). In Dunnigan v. Dunnigan,
182 Md. 47, 31 A.2d 634 (1943) and Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 165 Md. 547, 170 A. 180
(1934), offers of reconciliation raised in defense were made after the institution of the
divorce action by the other spouse. Such offers were not given the same consideration
as offers made before trial. In Kirkwood, where the wife offered to reconcile during
her own suit for constructive desertion, the court said that "The wife must recover
upon a cause of action subsisting at the time of her suit. . . ." 165 Md. at 553, 170 A.
at 183. As to other reasons for excluding offers, see notes 55-59 infra and accom-
panying text.
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of desertion from the time of the rejection : by rejecting a valid offer,
the innocent party became the guilty party. The necessary elements
of desertion - separation and intent to end the marriage relation -
still existed. However, the intent to end the marriage, and thus the
responsibility for the continuation of the separation, switched from
one party to the other.'"
A second situation arose when a husband and wife separated
without the separation qualifying as a voluntary separation under
the Maryland statute,'7 and without any ground for divorce on either
side.' Under these circumstances, if one spouse made a bona fide
offer to reconcile which was unjustifiably rejected, the spouse who
rejected the offer became responsible for the continuation of the
separation -and could be guilty of desertion. 9 Although the separation
as it commenced was faultless, the two elements of desertion coincided
when the offer was rejected and from this point constituted desertion."0
The third desertion situation in which offers of reconciliation
were given some importance arose when the deserted spouse offered to
reconcile with the deserting spouse and was rejected.2 ' In the process
of proving desertion, the deserted spouse would then use the rejection
of this offer as evidence of a continuing intent to end the marriage
relationship on the part of the deserter. 22 It should be noted that in
this situation the rejection of the offer was used only to prove a
pre-existing desertion as to which there was other evidence. By
contrast, in the first two situations, the rejection of the offer was used
in and of itself to create either a ground for, or a defense to, desertion.
In those situations, the offer effected a change in the respective legal
positions of the parties as they existed prior to the offer: an original
15. E.g., Hornstein v. Hornstein, 195 Md. 627, 75 A.2d 103 (1950); Backus v.
Backus, 167 Md. 19, 172 A. 270 (1934).
16. It should be understood that this case would involve two separate eighteen
month periods. The first one, beginning with the original desertion, is terminated
by the rejection of the offer. The period measuring the rejector's desertion would
have a difficult starting point, i.e., the point at which the offer is rejected. See, e.g.,
Hornstein v. Hornstein, 195 Md. 627, 75 A.2d 103 (1950).
17. MD. ANN. CODS art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969).
18. E.g., Jester v. Jester, 246 Md. 162, 228 A.2d 829 (1967); Dearholt v. Dear-
holt, 178 Md. 405, 13 A.2d 538 (1940).
19. E.g., Kaleta v. Kaleta, 247 Md. 517, 233 A.2d 468 (1967); Dearholt v. Dear-
holt, 178 Md. 405, 13 A.2d 538 (1940); Lynch v. Lynch, 166 Md. 300, 170 A. 764
'1934).
20. As the Maryland Court of Appeals said in dealing with an a mensa desertion:
"Separation and intention to abandon must concur in order to constitute cause of
divorce on ground of abandonment; but they need not be identical at their commence-
ment." Hubbard v. Hubbard, 127 Md. 617, 620-21, 96 A. 860, 862 (1916).
21. E.g., Heinmuller v. Heinmuller, 133 Md. 491, 105 A. 745 (1919); Buckner v.
Buckner, 118 Md. 101, 84 A. 156 (1912).
22. E.g., Stumpf v. Stumpf, 228 Md. 350, 179 A.2d 893 (1962) ; Kline v. Kline,
179 Md. 10, 16 A.2d 924 (1940).
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deserter suddenly had a valid defense or even a claim of desertion of
his own or a separation amounting to a legal stalemate could be trans-
formed into desertion. In light of the language of section 26A, this
distinction as to the effect of the offer of reconciliation in desertion
cases may well prove significant.
2 8
The Voluntary Separation Cases
The Maryland Court of Appeals has defined a voluntary separation,
entitling the spouses to an a vinculo divorce, 24 as a "physical separation
of the parties, by common consent with a common intent not to resume
marital relations. '2 Under the voluntary separation statute, the separa-
tion must continue for a period of eighteen months.2 16 If a spouse
who initially agreed to a voluntary separation makes an offer to
reconcile before the running of the eighteen month period, then
obviously the mutual consent not to resume marital relations no longer
exists. Thus, prior to the enactment of section 26A, a proper offer
to reconcile which was rejected could have been used by the offering
party as a defense to a divorce on the grounds of voluntary separation.27
Furthermore, as was the law concerning initially innocent separations
where a valid offer was subsequently made and rejected, the party
whose offer was rejected presumably would have a ground for divorce
based on desertion from that time on.2 Thus, as in the desertion
area, due to the court's underlying policy favoring reconciliation when-
ever possible, an offer of reconciliation could effectively alter the pre-
existing legal positions of the spouses. In effect, an offer could turn
a voluntary separation in-to desertion.
THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 16, SECTION 26A
Section 26A states that an offer of reconciliation cannot "in and
of itself" be a defense to a divorce. Nor can a refusal of such an
offer "in and of itself" be a defense to, or a ground for, a divorce.29
On its face the statute seems to be an attempt to take offers of reconcili-
ation completely out of the desertion and voluntary separation scheme
23. See text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1966).
25. France v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 176 Md. 306, 325, 4 A.2d 717, 725 (1939).
26. MD. ANN. CoD4 art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969).
27. E.g., Feltgen v. Feltgen, 237 Md. 32, 205 A.2d 251 (1964); Chalkley v.Chalkley, 236 Md. 329, 203 A.2d 877 (1964). In both cases the defense was not sus-
tained because the offers were held not to be in good faith.
28. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 26A (Supp. 1969).
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outlined above. That it is just such an attempt is attested to by the
brief history of the prior version of section 26A.
As originally enacted in 1965, section 26A only barred the use
of offers of reconciliation as a defense to a divorce." The absurdity
of this situation is demonstrated by Jester v. Jester.8" There the
spouses were living apart under circumstances which the court char-
acterized as entitling neither party to a divorce. However, during
the separation the wife had made offers of reconciliation which the
husband had unjustifiably rejected. The court cited the usual rule that
"his refusal constituted desertion from the time of refusal," 2 and
went on to point out that section 26A did not change this rule:
"[S] ection 26A states only that an offer of reconciliation not concurred
in by the other spouse shall not of itself be a defense or a bar to a
divorce .... Refusal of the reconciliation attempt without justification
continues to make the spouse refusing guilty of desertion." While
the facts in Jester, because of the nature of the initial separation, did
not necessitate such a conclusion, it is possible to pursue the reading
of the statute one step further; that is, that section 26A made it
possible for both parties to be guilty of desertion simultaneously.
Because of the statute, an original deserter could not use his offer to
reconcile as a defense to his spouse's suit on the ground of desertion.
However, the deserted spouse's rejection of the offer would give
the original deserter a claim of desertion of 'his own. This would
lead to the application of the doctrine of recrimination, so that neither
party could obtain a divorce. 4 Thus, in effect, the refusal of the offer
of reconciliation would still amount to a defense to the original desertion
and the statute's intended effect would be nullified. Presumably real-
30. MD. ANr;. CoDp art. 16, § 26A (1966). "In no action for divorce instituted in
this State... shall an offer of reconciliation or an attempt to reconcile by one spouse
without the concurrence of the other spouse be available as a defense to a divorce nor
in and of itself be a bar to a divorce."
31. 246 Md. 162, 228 A.2d 829 (1967).
32. Id. at 170, 228 A.2d at 834.
33. Id.
34. "Recrimination is generally defined as a rule or doctrine which precludes one
spouse from obtaining a divorce from the other, where the spouse seeking a divorcehas himself or herself been guilty of conduct which would entitle the oposite (sic)
spouse to a divorce." Courson v. Courson, 208 Md. 171, 174, 117 A.2d 850, 851 (1955).
Moreover, recrimination requires that the offsetting offenses be of equal magnitude;
that is, both a mensa or both a vinculo grounds. See Courson v. Courson, 208 Md.
171, 175-76, 117 A.2d 850, 852 (1955). The ground for divorce created by the rejec-
tion would be recriminatory in almost all instances, i.e., usually both grounds would
be of sufficient duration only for an a mensa divorce. A deviation from this norm
would occur where the original desertion was of a vinculo duration at the time the
offer was rejected. In this case, the original desertion is a vinculo while the deser-
tion based on the rejection of the offer is only a mensa, and thus recrimination would
not apply. However, this situation could also become recriminatory if the action was
not instituted until eighteen months after the offer was rejected, since both grounds
would then be of a vinculo duration.
[VOL. XXX
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izing this problem, the Maryland General Assembly rewrote section
26A into its present form.85
In plugging the gap left by the prior version of section 26A, the
Maryland legislature effectively barred almost all uses of offers of
reconciliation. The extent to which offers are still of legal importance
depends on an as yet non-existent interpretation of the phrase "in and
of itself" in section 26A."8 Under the present version of the statute,
an offer cannot be used which "in and of itself" is a defense to, or a
ground for, a divorce.8 7 One possible interpretation is that it means that
offers are still admissible when there is other evidence offered which
tends to show that the offering party actually desired reconciliation.
If an offer remains usuable in the same manner as before the enactment
of section 26A in a case where other evidence is introduced, then
section 26A has little or no effect. Seemingly such evidence could
always be produced, and if a reasonable alternative interpretation is
available which gives effect to the statute, it should be adopted. A
more likely interpretation is that offers of reconciliation are still usable
in cases where the offer only supports other evidence, but not where
the offer constitutes the basis of a legal position. Thus, of the four
situations discussed earlier in which offers have been given legal effect
under the prior law, the offer would still be usable only in the one in
which the deserted spouse utilizes the rejection of his offer as evidence
of a continuing intent to desert by the deserter. 8s Section 26A would
be no bar here since the offer -is not advanced as a ground in and of
itself. The rejection of the offer merely adds evidentiary support
to the pre-existing fact of desertion. However, in instances where
the offer is used to affect a change in the parties' legal positions, 9
section 26A would seem to bar use of the offer. In these cases, the
offer itself is the essential element in the ground or the defense.
Assuming this interpretation to be correct, the rewriting of
section 26A has reduced to a minimum the effect of offers of reconcilia-
tion in divorce litigation. It tis arguable that the results of such a
reduction on the substantive law of desertion and voluntary separation
are as undesirable as was the simultaneous desertion result arising out
of the prior version of section 26A.4 °
35. MD. AxN. CoDr art. 16, § 26A (Supp. 1969), quoted supra at note 4.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 12-20 and 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
40. See notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text.
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THE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES OF SECTION 26A
Section 26A effectively works a radical alteration in the elements
of desertion in Maryland as they existed prior to its enactment. As
discussed above, the basic requirements of desertion are a separation
and an intent to end the marriage relationship on the part of the
deserter which must continue throughout the separation.41 However,
as a result of section 26A, one can now be guilty of desertion even
though the requisite intent to end the marriage relation does not
exist for the required amount of time. For example, -in Hornstein v.
Hornstein42 a husband's bill for desertion was denied and a divorce
was granted to the wife for desertion on the basis of her husband's
rejection of her offer of reconciliation. The wife was originally guilty
of desertion, but her offers to reconcile had effected a reversal in the
parties' legal positions. Were the case decided today, a different
result would be reached. Under section 26A, the wife would not be
able to use her offer as a defense to the husband's bill or the husband's
rejection of the offer as a ground for her own bill. The result is that
the husband will get a divorce for desertion although his wife, as
evidenced by her offer, did not have the intent to end the marriage
relation for the entire period of the alleged desertion. In effect, section
26A institutes a "once a deserter, always a deserter" policy. Unless
an actual reconciliation takes place, any eighteen month separation
which began as desertion gives a valid ground for divorce regardless
of subsequent events.
Section 26A works an even stranger result where the initial
separation does not afford either party a ground for divorce. In this
case, instead of making a deserter out of the one who lacks the
requisite intent, the statute prevents a divorce for desertion being
obtained against a spouse who has satisfied all the desertion require-
ments. The rejection of the offer, it would seem, should be evidence
of the intent necessary to constitute desertion. Under the prior law,
once one party in this situation made a valid offer of reconciliation,
the other party would have to accept or run the risk of becoming a
deserter.43 Under section 26A, there is a legal standoff. The rejection
of an offer of reconciliation under these circumstances, which under
the prior definition of desertion would constitute the necessary element
of intent to desert by one party, is no longer usable in court. Thus
a "deserter" may avoid an adverse court decision simply because the
initial separation was less than desertion.
Lynch v. Lynch44 is a striking example of the radical change
wrought by section 26A. In that case, the wife had left her husband's
home to care for her sick father. After her father's death, her attempts
to return home were rejected by the husband. The wife, without means
of her own support, was forced to sue for separate alimony, an action
in which the wife must prove grounds entitling her to either an
41. See notes 5-11 supra and accompanying text.
42. 195 Md. 627, 75 A.2d 103 (1950).
43. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
44. 166 Md. 300, 170 A. 764 (1934).
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a vinculo or an a nensa divorce.45 She was able to sustain this
burden on the basis that the husband had deserted her by failing to
accept her offers to renew cohabitation. Under section 26A, the
wife would be unable to use her offers to return as proof of desertion
in order to gain the alimony she needed. Barring other grounds for
divorce or actual reconciliation, the offeror would be left to voluntary
separation or the new five-year separation statute46 as a ground for
obtaining a divorce and alimony from one who had separated from her
and who has the intent to end the marriage relationship.
It might be pointed out that it is a somewhat strained interpreta-
tion to call the situation presented in Lynch an "offer of reconcilia-
tion." However, prior to enactment of section 26A, the court of
appeals, as evidenced by Lynch, does not seem to have required that
there be any prior estrangement beyond the simple fact of living apart
in order to present a situation giving rise to an offer of reconciliation.
1
It is assumed that section 26A uses the term in the same sense,
although there is the possibility of reinterpretation so that section 26A
would not apply to this situation at all.
An equally drastic change in the traditional Maryland notions of
voluntary separation is effected by section 26A. As indicated earlier,
a voluntary separation under the Maryland statute requires two
basic elements: an eighteen month separation and a mutual intent
by the spouses to terminate the marriage. 48 Under the prior law, a
spouse could end the mutual intent by offering in good faith to reconcile
at any time during the period.49 Section 26A now prevents such a
use of an offer of reconciliation with the result that, as long as the
separation began as a voluntary separation, the passage of eighteen
months will produce a perfectly valid a vinculo divorce, even though
the mutual intent to end the marriage has terminated. Under the
earlier law, not only was there no mutual intent to end the marriage,
but the party who rejected the offer would be guilty of desertion from
the time of the rejection.5" Thus, in some cases section 26A will now
cause the court to grant a divorce for voluntary separation where the
state of mind of the parties more closely resembles that required for
desertion than for a "voluntary" separation.
A LEGISLATIVE MISTAKE?
In view of the fact that the Maryland law of desertion and volun-
tary separation has been drastically altered by a statute dealing with
the narrow subject of offers of reconciliation, one is tempted to ask
whether the legislature meant to do what it did. To answer this
question, it is necessary to know why the statute was enacted. Due
45. MD. ANN. Coim art. 16, § 2 (1966) ; see Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 129
A.2d 917 (1957) ; Zukerberg v. Zukerberg, 188 Md. 428, 53 A.2d 20 (1947).
46. MD. ANN. CoDm art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969).
47. See cases cited note 19 supra.
48. France v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 176 Md. 306, 4 A.2d 717 (1939). See
notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
49. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
50. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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to the absence of published committee reports or other legislative
history in Maryland, it is impossible to answer this question with
any certainty. The purpose of section 26A can only be surmised. It
is probably correct to say that section 26A was intended to prevent
spouses from effectively bettering their legal positions as to divorce
litigation by tricking the courts into thinking that they had truly
attempted reconciliation. The legislature must have had in mind a
deserter who was able to turn the tables through an offer of recon-
ciliation whose purpose was litigation rather than reconciliation.
For at least two reasons, it is doubtful that the legislature realized
that its efforts to put a stop to such legal maneuvering created radical
changes in the law of desertion and voluntary separation. First, it
could be argued simplistically that if the legislature had intended to
change the definitions of these divorce grounds they would have
amended article 16, section 24 rather than enacting an entirely new
section. Admittedly, such a direct amendment is not a precondition
of legal effectiveness. However, it does shed light on what the legis-
lature thought it was doing. Secondly, and more significantly, the
Maryland legislature last year enacted a statute making a five year
separation a ground for divorce regardless of the circumstances of the
separation or the existence of other grounds for divorce. 51 In providing
that recrimination should not be a defense to a divorce on this ground,5 2
the legislature clearly showed an intent to make a divorceable situation
out of a separation which could not qualify under the pre-existing
divorce grounds. In light of this, it hardly seems likely that the
legislature realized that, by virtue of section 26A, most previously
non-divorceable 
-separations were now divorceable on only eighteen
months of separation rather than five years.5"
In any event, section 26A is in force and its language is clear.
In addition to the earlier discussion, the statute raises other problems.
On a theoretical level, it could be asked whether the statute was
necessary, assuming its purpose was to prevent the kind of legal
maneuvering possible under the prior law. A look at the prior cases
evinces a set of limitations upon the use of offers of reconciliation
51. MD. ANN. COD art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969). It should be noted that part ofthis enactment, which deals with distributions of property under this new divorceground, has been held unconstitutional by a Maryland circuit court because of failureto comply with the requirements of titling bills set by § 29 of art. III of the MarylandConstitution. Buckheit v. Buckheit, No. _ 
_ 70 (Circuit Ct., Baltimore Co.,Jan. 6, 1970) in the Daily Record (Baltimore), Jan. 17, 1970, at 3, col. 1. The part
of the bill creating the new ground for divorce remains undisturbed.
52. MD. ANN. CoDS art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969).
53. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text. This point is accentuated bythe fact that the amendment to art. 16, § 24, which made a five-year separationgrounds for divorce was first offered for passage on the basis of a three year separa-tion. By increasing the duration to five years, the General Assembly seems to haveindicated a reluctance to allow a divorce for a separation which was not divorceable
under the prior law of desertion or voluntary separation except where the separation
was quite long lasting. As indicated, § 26A, allows such a result on only eighteen
months of separation, in all cases in which the separation began either as desertion
or voluntary separation. The only cases left for the five year statute to cover arethose where the initial separation was "innocent" where a spouse with grounds fordivorce chooses not to seek one.
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which functioned well in preventing spouses from abusing their use.
The general rule, applicable to both desertion and voluntary separation
cases, was that the offer, in order to be of legal effect, must have been
made in good faith and must have been free from unreasonable condi-
tions.54 The policy behind this rule is identical to that supposed to be
the basis of section 26A: that is, an offer deserves no recognition where
it "was merely designed to improve his legal position with reference
to his duty of support, without any sincere desire or intention that it
be accepted.5 5 Thus, offers made through intermediaries, 56 offers made
on the witness stand at the hearing, 57 and offers which show no suffi-
cient promise that the cause of the separation will be removed 58 have
all been held inadequate. Section 26A attempts to accomplish the same
result as the old rule by simply forbidding all use of offers. While the
result to be achieved is desirable, in light of the side effects of section
26A, it could certainly be argued that the prior case law provided ade-
quate safeguards to prevent the abuse of such offers.
A much more practical problem which section 26A raises con-
cerns the determination of alimony in divorce cases. In all cases where
a divorce is decreed in Maryland, alimony may be awarded ;59 this in-
cludes voluntary separation cases.60 The general rule as to the factors
to be considered in deciding whether alimony is proper in a given case
was stated in Waters v. Waters: 1
In determining an award of alimony and whether "the wife's
income is insufficient to care for her needs," the court should con-
sider the husband's wealth and earning capacity, the station in life
of the parties, age, physical condition, the ability to work, the
length of time the parties have lived together, the circumstances
leading up to the divorce, and the fault which destroyed the
home.62
If then, fault is a factor in determining alimony, section 26A raises a
serious question. Consider the case in which a husband deserts for a
short time and then offers in good faith to be reconciled, only to be un-justifiably rejected by the wife. Because of section 26A, the husband
is still guilty of desertion. But what about the alimony problem? Since
fault is an element, could the husband tender proof of the wife's refusal
of his offer in order to deny her alimony on the basis of fault? Section
26A only prevents the use of offers as a defense to, or a ground for, a
divorce; it says nothing about determining alimony. Yet if such proof
54. E.g., Feltgen v. Feltgen, 237 Md. 32, 205 A.2d 251 (1964) (voluntary separa-
tion) ; Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 165 Md. 547, 170 A. 180 (1934) (desertion).
55. Hokemeyer v. Hokemeyer, 194 Md. 223, 227, 71 A.2d 15, 17 (1950).
56. E.g., Hokemeyer v. Hokemeyer, 194 Md. 223, 71 A.2d 15 (1950).
57. E.g., Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 165 Md. 547, 170 A. 180 (1934).
58. E.g., Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657,22 A.2d 475 (1941).
59. MD. ANN. CODs art. 16, § 3 (1966).
60. E.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 216 Md. 374, 140 A.2d 649 (1958) ; Foote v. Foote,
190 Md. 171, 57 A.2d 804 (1948).
61. 191 Md. 436, 62 A2d 250 (1948).
62. Id. at 440-41, 62 A.2d at 252 (emphasis added).
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is allowed, the court is technically contradicting itself by giving a wife
a divorce on the basis that the separation was the husband's fault while
denying the wife alimony on the basis that the separation was her fault.
The simple answer to the problem may be that fault is not the only
criterion for alimony, and that section 26A operates to minimize the
fault connotation attached to a refusal of reconciliation where the ques-
tion of alimony is concerned. However, it is clear that section 26A on
its face does not prevent use of the offer in determining alimony.
IN DEFENSE OF SECTION 26A: SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the substantial, and possibly unforseen, effects of section
26A in the areas of desertion and voluntary separation, one can find
much to commend the statute in its overall application to divorce liti-
gation in Maryland. Limited to considerations of voluntary separation,
several beneficial aspects are apparent. By insuring that once a vol-
untary separation agreement is entered it will be binding unless the
spouses mutually rescind it, section 26A has merely placed these agree-
ments on a par with other contracts. It is a fundamental principle
of contract law that a contract validly entered cannot be disregarded
with impunity by unilateral action.6" This is exactly what was per-
mitted by prior case law when it was held that an offer of reconciliation
ended the requisite mutual in'tent to terminate the marriage, thus end-
ing the voluntary separation.6 4 In putting an end to this situation,
section 26A is in accordance with the modern trend toward giving
separation agreements more importance in the domestic relations area.65
Such a trend is of obvious value to the administration of divorce litiga-
tion in that ,it allows the parties to settle out of court many of the seri-
ous problems inherent in a divorce. Section 26A, by making the agree-
ment binding once entered, will tend to aid in this by insuring that
parties will not make such agreements without considerable thought
and consideration. A carefully drafted separation agreement can go a
long way toward easing the work and time load of a judicial system.
In its general application, section 26A does much to liberalize di-
vorce law in Maryland. Although it 'has always been a policy that
divorce was -to be discouraged whenever possible,66 the more modern
view recognizes that more harm than good is done by making it difficult
for estranged spouses to become legally divorced.6" Insofar as offers
of reconciliation were used as defenses, this was precisely their effect
63. See S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1288 (Rev. ed. 1937).
64. E.g., Feltgen v. Feltgen, 237 Md. 32, 205 A.2d 251 (1964).65. A 1968 amendment to the Maryland Annotated Code provides that the intro-duction into evidence of a valid separation agreement in an action for voluntary separa-tion shall serve as full corroboration of the plaintiff's case. MD. ANN. CODe art. 35,§ 4 (Supp. 1969). Avoiding the usual corroboration rule, the plaintiff need offer noother proof than the agreement as to the mutual and voluntary nature of the separation.66. "The law will not countenance the living apart of a husband and wife inMaryland except for grave and weighty causes." Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, 15, 16A.2d 924, 926 (1940). See note 1 supra and accompanying text.67. See, e.g., Comment, A Divorce Reform Act, 5 HARV. J. LGis. 563 (1968).In presenting a model divorce reform act, this comment discusses the myriad of
reasons why liberalization of divorce laws is desirable.
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under the prior law.8 s As has been shown, section 26A permits a di-
vorce for an eighteen month separation which began as a desertion
regardless of subsequent events. 69 In essence, with the exception of the
case where the initial separation is "innocent," the statute provides that
an irreconcilable separation of eighteen months is grounds for divorce.
70
In an indirect manner, Maryland has joined with an increasing number
of other states which are providing for a divorce under such circum-
stances.71 As one writer observed, "when the marriage has irreparably
deteriorated, the state should not attempt by legal controls to preserve
what by social controls can no longer be preserved. '7 2 In light of this
modern view of divorce, section 26A may well produce a beneficial
result. After all, when spouses cannot get together after eighteen
months, one is hard pressed to justify preventing a legal finalization
of the separation. It seems quite obvious that society is better served
by a good divorce than a bad marriage.
Section 26A will also aid the administration of divorce litigation
in general by keeping offers of reconciliation out of the courts. Under
the prior law, by definition, the only offers which ever came before a
court were unsuccessful ones. It could be argued that, apart from indi-
cating fault as a basis for determining alimony or custody, society has
no interest in having courts consider offers of reconciliation which were
not successful in reuniting the spouses. The prior law led to spouses
making offers simply to better their respective legal positions. Although
there were rules which attempted to separate these offers from the ones
made in good faith'7 the process was difficult, unpleasant, and far from
exact. The value of considering such offers does not justify the cost
paid in terms of the courts' time and trouble.
In addition to alleviating a messy administrative problem, the new
statute will help the image of the judiciary as a whole. It cannot be
doubted that a serious problem in this vein exists today in the area of
domestic relations.
The present discrepancy between the law on the books and
the law in action has developed into a serious threat to the morals
of the bar and the respect for law among the public. Law cannot
68. It should be noted that offers of reconciliation under the prior law did not
always prevent divorce. Often they simply determined who would get the divorce.
69. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
70. It should be remembered that this result of § 26A is in apparent conflict with
the new five year separation statute. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
71. New Mexico and Oklahoma have had on the books for quite some time pro-
visions allowing a divorce on the ground of incompatibility. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22:7-1
(1953) ; OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 1271 (1961). In a more drastic step, California has
recently amended its law to provide for only two grounds for dissolution of the
marriage; "incurable insanity" and "irreconcilable differences, which have caused the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage." CAL. CIV. CODe § 4506 (West Supp. 1969).
In order to avoid any resemblance to the traditional contested divorce proceeding in
which fault played so large a part, the act further provides that "In any pleadings or
proceedings for legal separation or dissolution of marriage under this part . . .
evidence of specific acts of misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible, except
where child custody is an issue. ... CAL. CiV. CODZ § 4509 (West Supp. 1969).
The apparent view is to allow a divorce where one or both parties feel the situation
is hopeless, and can prove it, without resorting to the traditional "bloody" battle.
72. Comment, A Divorce Reform Act, 5 HAIv. J. LJGlS. 563, 567 (1968).
73. See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
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remain workable or maintain dignity when, like the American
experience under alcoholic prohibition, a substantial part of the
country believes that prohibited conduct is in fact right and another
part does not care about strict enforcement. Such is the case with
divorce law, an area where many have their only litigious experi-
ence. People are faced not only with a fault oriented basis which
they try to circumvent, but also with the spectacle of ritualistic
name calling at a public trial. 4
Although the statute has certain seemingly unintended effects on the
substantive law of divorce, by eliminating a practice whose only value
was fixing the blame for a hopeless situation, section 26A will ultimately
take a step toward spanning the credibility gap between the law and the
people.
Probably the most important benefit which can be -seen to flow
from section 26A is not readily apparent at first glance. The law con-
cerning offers of reconciliation arose because society felt that recon-
ciliation was preferable to divorce.75 Now section 26A has effectively
eliminated all the rules which grew up under this policy. And yet, sec-
tion 26A probably will do more to encourage actual reconciliation than
did the prior rules. Previously, in order to encourage reconciliation,
it was felt advisable to penalize a spouse who refused it. Such a rule
probably prevented actual reconciliation in many cases because a spouse
would avoid an offer which he thought was merely a legal ploy in
order that he not be 'held to have refused it. By providing that an offer
of reconciliation can no longer produce a change in the parties' pre-
existing legal positions, section 26A has opened the way for spouses
to discuss reconciliation freely and without fear of adverse consequences
in the event the attempt at reconciliation fails. Section 26A is a step
toward shifting the focus of the law away from problems of dispensing
rewards and penalties for acts which failed of reconciliation toward
society's real concern - actual reconciliation.
Joseph M. Fairbanks
74. Comment, A Divorce Reform Act, 5 HARv. J. LGIs. 563, 569 (1968).
75. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
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